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Benedict Arnold led an invasion of Quebec during the first year of the Revolu-
tionary War. Arnold was an ardent Patriot in the early years of the war, but later
became the most famous American turncoat of the era. Maine Historical Soci-
ety Collections. 
“NEWS OF PROVISIONS AHEAD”: 
ACCOMMODATION IN A WILDERNESS
BORDERLAND DURING THE 
AMERICAN INVASION OF QUEBEC,
17751
BY DANIEL S. SOUCIER
Soon after the American Revolutionary War began, Colonel Benedict
Arnold led an American invasion force from Maine into Quebec in an ef-
fort to capture the British province. The trek through the wilderness of
western Maine did not go smoothly. This territory was a unique border-
land area that was not inhabited by colonists as a frontier society, but in-
stead remained a largely unsettled region still under the control of the
Wabanakis. On the northern periphery of this borderland the Quebecois
and Wabanakis supplied Arnold and his men with provisions, aid, and
intelligence. It was the assistance of French habitants and Wabanakis in
Quebec that saved the mission. Historians who have written about
Arnold’s march through this borderland region have tended to view it as
simply a heroic feat by the American force. Yet, both the natural and hu-
man environment of this borderland region played a significant role in
the expedition’s near failure to escape the Maine wilderness and ulti-
mately its success in reaching Quebec City. The author is a graduate stu-
dent at the University in Maine, focusing on the environmental history
of the American Revolution. He is the secretary of the Environmental
Studies Coalition at the University of Maine, co-editor of the Khronikos
blog and journal, and the webmaster of the Northeastern Atlantic
Canada Environmental History Forum.
THE FEARS of armed conflict between the American colonies andBritain became a reality on April 19, 1775, when British forces setforth on a march to Concord, Massachusetts, intent on capturing
armament stores located in the town. As the gunman on Lexington
Green fired the famous shot heard round the world, the flintlock of his
firearm sparked a chain of events that would eventually lead to Ameri-
can independence. By the time the war began, Benedict Arnold had built
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a dedicated entourage of Patriots in his hometown of New Haven, Con-
necticut. In the winter of 1774, Arnold and over sixty other men estab-
lished a local militia company in New Haven. Because of his merchant
business, Arnold was a well-respected member of the community. His
standing in the community and his reputation as a resolute proponent
of the rights of American colonists compelled the men of the company
to elect him as their captain. When word of the fighting at Lexington
and Concord reached Arnold in Connecticut, he assembled his militia
company, and they set forth to join their Patriot brethren in Massachu-
setts. 
Once there, Arnold utilized his social network through both Patriot
and Masonic channels to obtain a commission as a colonel in the Massa-
chusetts service. His primary objective was to embark on a mission to
capture Fort Ticonderoga in New York and secure the artillery stored
there by the British. This task was of great importance to many Patriot
leaders as there were strong suspicions of a British plan to invade the
colonies from British North America (modern-day Canada).2 During
Arnold’s tenure in the Lake Champlain region, he thought often about
the threat of invasion from British North America. The intelligence re-
ports he received combined with the daily command situation on the
ground to add validity to these fears. Arnold, proactive in his military
strategy, conceived a plan for the Patriot force to swiftly attack Montreal
and Quebec. This plan had two objectives: to eliminate the British threat
to the north and to secure the French and Indian populations of Quebec
as allies.3
While Arnold was seizing the artillery in the Lake Champlain region,
the Second Continental Congress convened and created an army of reg-
ulars, printed paper currency to support this professional army, and des-
ignated George Washington as the commander of the Patriot force. On
June 27, 1775, after careful consideration of an operational plan sent by
Arnold, Congress decided to send an invading force into Canada with
the intent of capturing Quebec City and bringing the rest of Quebec
into the Revolution as the fourteenth rebellious colony. This invasion
was to be launched from the Patriot-held forts on Lake Champlain and
led by General Phillip Schuyler of New York, an influential veteran of the
Seven Years’ War. His political standing and geographic proximity made
him the rational and pragmatic choice to lead the expedition.4
Although Arnold was disappointed that he was not chosen to lead
the invasion of Canada from the Champlain region, he did not abandon
hope for personal involvement in the mission. Instead, he devised a plan
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for a secondary invading force that would leave the Patriot stronghold at
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and travel to Canada through the wilderness
of Maine, down the Chaudière River in Canada to the capital city of
Quebec. General Washington was convinced that a two-pronged inva-
sion of Canada would force Canadian Governor Guy Carleton to aban-
don either Montreal or Quebec, leaving the other defenseless. Arnold’s
expedition set sail for the Maine wilderness on September 19, 1775. 
Most historians who have written about the Arnold expedition have
either dismissed his trek through Maine as a relatively minor aspect of
the larger mission to capture Quebec City or have celebrated the march
solely for Arnold’s great leadership and courage. The Maine landscape,
its people, and the people of frontier Canada are generally seen as largely
incidental. Historian James Leamon, for example, has written: 
Overall Arnold’s expedition made little impact on Maine, which
merely represented territory to be crossed en route to the objective.
Quebec was not a major concern for Maine, and few of its residents
participated in the campaign. Arnold’s march is remembered today
chiefly as an example of inspired leadership and heroic endurance, all
the more poignant in the awareness of its futility.5
The march through Maine has often been considered, as one of Arnold’s
biographers put it, “one of the hardest marches in the annals of war.”6
The prevailing narrative supports Leamon’s argument that there was lit-
tle historical significance to Arnold’s march through the wilds of Maine,
other than the men made it through to Quebec. 
However, the Maine wilderness was not simply a backdrop for the
expedition to Quebec. The rugged territory of western Maine through
which Arnold and his men trekked should be regarded as both a re-
source that supplied food, shelter, maintenance equipment, and other
necessities, as well as an obstacle that governed the strategic decisions of
military commanders.7 This landscape traveled by Arnold and his men –
through western Maine into the Chaudière River Valley in Quebec – was
not a frontier region at the edge of an empire but instead a “howling
wilderness” that was situated between two competing powers, each with
its own ideology concerning the fate of British North America. This
wilderness region was not inhabited by colonists as a frontier society, but
instead remained an unsettled region still under the control of the Wa-
banakis.8 On the northern periphery of this borderland, the Quebecois
and Wabanakis supplied Arnold and his men with provisions, aid, and
intelligence, despite the fact that the British authorities in Quebec in-
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structed them not to do so. Throughout the march from Maine to Que-
bec, Arnold’s force was at the mercy of both the natural environment
and the human settlements of this borderland region; each could serve
as obstacle and as aide to the mission’s survival.
Arnold and his troops assembled at Fort Western – located in mod-
ern-day Augusta – in late September 1775. The objective of this force
was to reach Quebec by traveling up and alongside the Kennebec River
through the Maine wilderness, then portage over the Great Carrying
Place to the Dead River, which they would also ascend. From there, they
would travel over the Height of Land to the Chaudière River, which
eventually flows into the St. Lawrence River, less than five miles from the
fortifications at Quebec.9 Before commencing this journey, Arnold or-
ganized the men into four main divisions. The first was comprised of
Captain Daniel Morgan and his backwoods riflemen who “wore coarse
hunting shirts, animal hide leggings over their woolen trousers, short
coats and moccasins.”10 These men were to serve as scouts and trailblaz-
ers for the expedition. The second and third divisions were comprised of
infantry, led by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Greene and Major
Jonathan Return Meigs, respectively. The fourth division, or rear guard,
was led by Colonel Roger Enos, and would carry the bulk of the provi-
sions as it would be traveling upon a beaten trail following the three
other groups of soldiers.11 Arnold sent these divisions one day’s journey
apart to prevent the whole expedition from becoming ensnared in the
obstacles and portages that lay in wait. Arnold himself would travel in a
birch bark canoe paddled by Indian guides to move swiftly from the rear
guard to the scouting party and back to check on progress and to man-
age difficulties.12
There were two main goals that Patriot leaders hoped the Arnold ex-
pedition would accomplish. First, it would remove the threat of attack –
whether real or imagined – posed by the British and Mohawk forces to
the north by giving control of fortifications such as Montreal and Que-
bec to General Washington. Additionally, the Patriot commander would
gain control of the St. Lawrence waterway, which provided water-based
access to a majority of inland British North America. Second, with con-
trol of Canada, the Continental forces could gain a valuable ally in the
eighty thousand Quebecois who had a long history of conflict with the
British.13 Arnold himself argued that control of Quebec and the rest of
Canada would provide America with “an inexhaustible granary” and
would furthermore, “cut the British from the lucrative fur trade.”14 Pa-
triot leaders hoped that victory in Quebec would give them a decisive
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advantage in their quest for home rule, whether achieved through inde-
pendence or reconciliation.  
Although there were not many soldiers from the District of Maine
who participated in the invasion of Quebec, a few Mainers played criti-
cal roles in helping the expedition make it through the “howling wilder-
ness” of Maine. Pittston resident and shipbuilder Reuben Colburn was
contracted to build 200 shallow, flat-bottomed boats called bateaux for
forty shillings per vessel. In addition, Colburn and approximately two
dozen of his carpenters were hired to accompany Arnold’s men to the
Dead River to repair these crafts as needed.15 The day before arriving at
Colburn’s shipyard, much to Arnold’s surprise, Maine patriot Samuel
McCobb and twenty volunteers excitedly met and applauded Arnold,
who graciously allowed them to join the ranks.16 Two other Mainers,
John Getchell and Jeremiah Horne of Vassalboro, both of whom had ex-
perience traveling the waterways and woodland trails in the region,
served as guides for Arnold and his men.17 In addition to these volun-
teers, several Indians served as guides, messengers, and, in one case, as an
anonymous helper who left a map crafted from a bark scroll for Arnold’s
lost troops. Although these Mainers numbered less than five percent of
the total expedition, most were instrumental in the success of the Patriot
force as they trekked through the wilderness of Maine. 
As historian George Stanley has noted, “Arnold’s expedition was not
striking off into the unknown.”18 The route up the Kennebec River over
the Height of Land to the Chaudière River was a well-known wilderness
highway for small French and Indian expeditions throughout the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, Arnold utilized the map and
journal of British engineer John Montressor, who travelled the same
route in 1761 during the French and Indian War. However, in the past, it
had only been accomplished with small mobile forces consisting of light
birch bark canoes.19 The boats crafted by Reuben Colburn for the expe-
dition, however, were not light. Due to the urgency of the order, Colburn
had to fabricate the bateaux out of green wood, which made them ex-
traordinarily heavy. Estimated to weigh approximately four hundred
pounds each, one historian has noted that they appeared to have been
“an attempt to marry the traditional Maine logging boat with a lighter
craft designed for speed and portability.”20
In addition to portaging with the bateaux, the men also had to trans-
port their supplies and implements of war. For a force of over 1,100 men
this required them to “fight their way through with guns and armament,
barrels of flour and pork, cooking kits, tents, oars, poles, and carpenters’
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Map of the route taken by Arnold’s force through Maine. Arnold and his men
embarked from Fort Western in present-day Augusta, traveled up the Kennebec
River past present-day Skowhegan, and then followed the Dead River through
western Maine to the Chaudière River in southern Quebec. From Justin H.
Smith, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony: Canada and the American Revolu-
tion, vol. 1 (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1907), p. 512. 
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Map of the route taken by Arnold’s force through Quebec. Arnold and his men
followed the Chaudière River most of the way towards Quebec City before
breaking away and heading toward the St. Lawrence River and their  ultimate
destination. From Justin H. Smith, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony:
Canada and the American Revolution, vol. 1 (New York: The Knickerbocker
Press, 1907), p. 582.
supplies, including barrels of nails.”21 Contrary to the previous success-
ful small expeditions through this wilderness highway, Arnold’s model
was based on the methods of the traditional European war machine,
which would later prove to be problematic in the wilds of Maine. Histo-
rian Robert Middlekauff has argued that “Arnold’s optimism” about the
journey through the Maine wilderness “was equaled only by his igno-
rance of the geography of the Northeast.” To the detriment of his expe-
ditionary force, Arnold “thought that he had only 180 miles to travel; in
reality he had 350 that would take him forty-five days to cover.”22 Fur-
thermore, Arnold greatly underestimated the agency of the Maine
wilderness in his expedition.
As Historian Geoffrey Plank has illustrated, soldiers serving in a war
often “kept diaries during their period of service because they expected
their military service” and their surroundings “to be extraordinary.”23
The war diaries of the men in Arnold’s expedition were rife with com-
mentary pertaining to the wilderness environment that surrounded
them. The men catalogued flora and fauna, described their surround-
ings in romantically aesthetic terms, and highlighted the role of the
wilderness as both a provider and as an obstacle. Throughout their jour-
ney, the agency of the land was paramount.
Environmental historian William Cronon has argued that explorers
arriving in the New World catalogued and listed “natural products
which were of potential use to a European way of life” as a means to un-
derstand nature through a process of commodification. Cronon ex-
plained that “little sense of ecological relationships emerges from such a
list. One could not use it to describe what the forest actually looked like
or how these trees interacted with one another. Instead, its purpose was
to detail resources for the interest of future undertakings.”24 The men of
Arnold’s expedition responded to their new environment in the wilds of
Maine in the same fashion. Dr. Isaac Senter noted in his journal that “the
spruce, cedar and hemlock were the chief growth of the earth, and these
were in tolerable plenty, almost impenetrably so in many places.”25 Re-
turn Meigs listed “the timber” as containing “butternut, beech, hemlock,
white pine red cedar, &c.”26 Benedict Arnold himself wrote that the land
was “in general fertile & tolerably well wooded with some Oak, Elm,
Ash, Beech Maple, Pine, Hemlock, &c.”27 Fauna were also methodically
listed as well, “Salmon and Trouts – river full of Fish – Plenty of Beaver
minks and Otter – very Good Land both Sides of the river.”28
This systematic listing was juxtaposed by depictions of the wilder-
ness as providing a visual aesthetic that brought hope to a landscape full
of despair and suffering. Arnold described his surroundings on October
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14, as “very beautiful & noble” with “a high chain of mountains encir-
cling the Pond, which is deep, clear & fine water, over which a forked
mountain which exceeds the rest in height bear N. west, & covered with
Snow, in contrast with the others adds greatly to the beauty of the
scene.”29 Arnold’s depiction of the wilderness aesthetic was not surpris-
ing as it could have likely been shaped by trying to impress his superior,
General Washington, who was receiving copies of his journal. However,
a pattern emerged from several other soldiers. Meigs was smitten by the
little joys nature provided noting that the “rocks are polished curiously
in some places.”30 Most surprising was Dr. Senter, whose company di-
vided the last remaining provisions on October 28. Three days later,
though starving and in peril, he noted that “the Chaudière is beautiful,
and formed a very agreeable ascent.”31
In addition to providing Arnold and his men with a curious world of
aesthetic wonder, the near virgin wilderness of Maine was a source of
food and forage. Arnold noted that his soldiers “caught a prodigious
number of fine salmon trout, nothing being more common than a man’s
taking 8 or 10 Doz in one hours time, which generally weigh half a
pound a piece.”32 He also noted that he saw “Plenty of Moose and other
game on the [Kennebec] River.”33 Indeed, Meigs confirmed Arnold’s en-
try concerning game, mentioning that by October 13 his “men have
killed four moose, which is excellent meat.”34 The expedition members
were also able to supplement their provisions by hunting birds such as
woodcocks, hawks, and partridge.35 Moreover, when Captain Henry
Dearborn “was Seized with a Violent Head-Ach and fever” the wilder-
ness bestowed upon him “herbs in the woods,” which were crafted into
“Tea” for his relief.36 Equally important as food and medicine, nature
provided a combination of roots, birch bark, and tree pitch, which could
be utilized by the expeditionary force, whenever necessary, to repair
their birch bark canoes.37
Although nature provided the troops with food and forage, the un-
tamed Maine wilderness and its climate were also major obstacles to the
expedition. It rained heavily for three consecutive days, from October
19-21, as the men were on the Dead River. In retrospect it is likely the
men suffered through the rains of a Caribbean hurricane that had trav-
eled along the east coast to Maine. One evening, in the midst of this rain,
Arnold and his men camped in for the evening and were awoken at ap-
proximately four o’clock in the morning when the river had risen “8 feet
perpendicular in 9 hours,” flooding their campsite, clothes, blankets, and
provisions.38
The harsh fall weather caused fish and wildlife to become very
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scarce. By the final days of October, the men in the expedition were des-
perate for provisions. One soldier noted in his journal that “his com-
rades shot a robin and a ferret” for sustenance.39 On October 28, Arnold,
realizing that the overextension of his supply line created the dire situa-
tion which was taking hold of the expedition, pushed forward with a
small party, hoping to secure food and provisions for his men. He was
concerned though, “that a trap might be sprung” upon arriving “at the
settlements with the wilderness at their backs.”40 The only other option,
however, was to let his force starve in the wilderness between Maine and
Quebec. From this point forward, the success of the mission, as well as
the lives of the troops, rested in the hands of the French and Wabanaki
inhabitants of the Beauce region of Quebec. 
On the evening of October 30, Arnold and his small foraging party
arrived at the first Canadian settlement in Beauce-Sartigan, Quebec,
where he relayed a message to the Quebecois peoples from General
George Washington requesting assistance for the troops.41 In this mes-
sage, Washington asked the inhabitants of Quebec, “as friends and
brothers, to supply the army with the provisions it needed, for the cause
of liberty was the cause of every good citizen, whatever his ancestry or
religion.”42 The inhabitants obliged Washington’s request for assistance
and Arnold procured supplies for his men including oxen, sheep, coarse
oatmeal, two horses, and “500 lbs. of flour,” which were sent back into
the wilderness under the supervision of “Lt. Church, Mr. Barrin and 8
Frenchmen.”43 Despite Washington’s friendly letter, the leadership in the
thirteen colonies did not have a change of heart concerning the Catholic
faith or their concern about their “papist” neighbors to the north. In-
stead, they adopted a pragmatic approach towards the Quebecois be-
cause they understood that the landscape and people of Quebec
Province could play an instrumental role in gaining home rule or inde-
pendence from England.44 The acceptance of Washington’s letter by the
inhabitants of Quebec was the first step in the process of accommoda-
tion between the Yankee Protestants and the French Catholics.
Although the laborious journey through the wilderness was now over
for Arnold himself, it was during the final days in the wilds, as October
turned to November, in which his men experienced the most intense tor-
tures of the expedition.45 Throughout the journey, water had seeped and
splashed into the bateaux and rotted a great portion of the food stores,
including the bread, peas, and salted meat.46 Additionally, many bateaux
had capsized and splintered on the rocks and rapids of the rivers causing
a great loss of provisions. The defection of Colonel Roger Enos and his
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company of rear guard on October 24 exacerbated matters. Enos and his
men broke Arnold’s orders and retreated back to Cambridge, choosing
self-preservation over the threat of starvation in the wilderness. Enos’ de-
fection cost Arnold not only approximately three hundred soldiers but
also a preponderance of the remaining provisions.47 By the end of the
month, food was scarce. On October 30, twenty-four-year-old Captain
Henry Dearborn noted that “some Companies had but one pint of Flour
for Each Man and no Meat at all.”48 John Joseph Henry, who was sixteen
years of age at the time of the march, recounted that the men had made
“a good fire, but no food.” He felt that “the world had lost its charm.”
Faced with the possibility of starvation in the isolated wilderness he
stated that his “privatations in every way were such as to produce a will-
ingness to die.”49 Henry surely was not the only soldier to consider taking
his own life at this stage of the journey. 
With little to sustain them, the men resorted to boiling, cooking, and
eating anything they had in their possession. They consumed hair
grease, shoes, cartridge boxes, soap, candles, lip balm, and anything they
could obtain from the wilderness, including a squirrel’s head.50 On No-
vember 1, Dearborn wrote in his journal that “Capt. Goodrich’s Com-
pany kill’d my Dog, and another dog, and Eat them.”51 “The distressed
soldiers eat” these, he continued, “with good appetite,” relishing “even
the feet and skins.”52 Commenting on the incident, Dr. Isaac Senter
noted that the “poor animal was instantly devoured, without leaving any
vestige of the sacrifice.”53 Another soldier remarked that he ate “part of
the hind quarter of a dog for supper.” He added: “we are in a pitiful con-
dition.” 54 The officers realized the grave situation and issued orders for
every man to take care of himself, practice self-preservation, and move
onward to the Canadian settlements. As they left their fallen compan-
ions, the starving called out asking if they planned to “leave us to perish
in this wilderness?” This greatly affected Private George Morison who
recalled in his journal that “never will that heart-piercing interrogatory
forsake my memory.” 55
The distress felt in the wilderness was not isolated to men only, as at
least two wives and an Indian woman, Jacatacqua, – the companion of a
young Aaron Burr – had joined the men on their expedition.56 Though
these women were not greatly discussed in the diaries, Abner Stocking
recalled with sorrow the struggle of one of the wives and her husband: 
My heart was ready to burst and my eyes to overflow with tears when I
witnessed distress which I could not relieve. The circumstances of a
young Dutchman, and his wife, who followed him through this fatigu-
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ing march, particularly excited my sensibility. They appeared to be
much interested in each other’s welfare and unwilling to be separated,
but the husband, exhausted with fatigue and hunger fell a victim to the
king of terrors. His affectionate wife tarryed by him until he died,
while the rest of the company proceeded on their way. Having no im-
plements with which she could bury him she covered him with leaves,
and then took his gun and other implements and left him with a heavy
heart. After traveling 20 miles she came up with us.57
This story exemplifies what historian James Axtell has written about
warfare in colonial America: “in the tangled forests and tumbling rivers
of eastern America, bulky European war machines broke down.”58 The
soldiers of the expedition were in such dire straits that they heeded their
officers’ call to try to save their own lives despite the suffering of those
around them. The loyalty, courage, and strength displayed by the un-
named wife of the Dutchman exceeded that of her husband’s brothers in
arms. Not only did she remain behind but, without provisions, carried
both of their remaining gear and his gun twenty miles before catching
up with the rest of the company.  
Arnold and his small detachment were, on the other hand, faring
much better at this time. On November 1, John Pierce, engineer and sur-
veyor for the march, recorded that he “dined with the Indians” and
“Slept between two Frenchmen in a French house.”59 He also purchased
twenty pounds of butter for the troops. Pierce and Arnold both noted
that the inhabitants of the French settlements were “very friendly”60 and
that they were “Treated very Kindly this Night,” though Pierce did note
that it was “very odd to hear them at their Devotion.”61
Washington had the foresight to understand that verbal abuses of the
Quebecois by Arnold and his men would be rapidly disseminated
throughout the larger Catholic community in North America, and
might hinder Arnold’s march and the greater war effort. Thus he issued
strict orders to Arnold to ban anti-Catholic rhetoric from his men.
Colonel Arnold was to administer “punishment for every infraction of
these instructions.”62 Arnold made sure that everything was done in his
power to instill confidence in the French people of Quebec that his force
was not an invading force but, instead, a liberating force that offered
both the prospect of home rule and freedom from British tyranny. His-
torian Charles Metzger noted that Arnold “seized every occasion to pro-
claim that the Americans would respect the persons, property, and reli-
gion of the Canadians.”63
On November 2, Dearborn had only marched four miles when he
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met the Frenchmen sent by Arnold with the provisions. This surreal
sight, he wrote, “Causd the Tears to Start from my Eyes.”64 Shortly after,
when the men of the rifle company arrived, the reactions from the other
men were similar; many noted that it was the most joyful sight they had
seen in their entire lives. Others stared at one another in disbelief,
“doubting our senses.”65 Those who had the strength cheered a “feeble
huzza of joy.”66 Almost immediately, livestock was killed and prepared
for the fire. However, most of the emaciated soldiers, in their famished
condition, were unable to wait and consumed their bounty straight from
the butcher’s blade.67 This metamorphosis from starvation to nourish-
ment was best described by Private George Morison, who exclaimed that
“this sudden change was like a transition from death to life.”68 They ate
small rations of beef and coarse oatmeal, and yet believed they had
“feasted sumptuously.”69 While the soldiers were dividing rations and
eating their newly found provisions, several Indian women came to their
relief in canoes selling small cakes ““for a shilling each, and quickly de-
voured.”70 Furthermore, the Frenchmen continued upriver to rescue
those who had fallen and were ground-ridden due to famine and fa-
tigue. Private Morison noted that the French “gave them bread and saved
them from death, [and] placed them on horses” to be brought up with
the others at camp.71
Meanwhile, back in the French settlements, some of the men were
beginning to trickle out of their wilderness prison, arriving in scattered
and dispersed groups. Private James Melvin came to the first house he
had seen in several weeks and purchased boiled rice from the Indians he
met.72 Unfamiliar with the relationship between the French and the In-
dians, the close living proximity surprised many of the troops as they
came out of the wilderness expecting “a region full of French settlers.”
Instead, in several of the first communities the American troops
reached, the Native population far outnumbered the French.73
Arnold continued to massage relations with the French and Indians,
hoping to convince them to join his forces. Most had presumed that the
Indian-controlled wilderness was impenetrable by such a large force.
Impressed by the bravery of Arnold and his men, the Wabanakis joined
him and his officers in a ceremonial meeting.74 One soldier noted that
they were “joined by about seventy or eighty Indians, all finely orna-
mented in their way with broaches, bracelets, and other trinkets, and
their faces painted.”75 The Indians addressed Arnold as the Dark Eagle
and they agreed to join forces with him. One of their leaders exclaimed
“that the brave men who had come through the woods must have
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pleased the Great Father and must therefore conquer their foes” – the
British.76 Though their journey had been incredibly arduous and caused
some of the troops to return to Cambridge, it was the trials experienced
in the wilderness that earned Arnold and his men the respect of the
French and Indian populations of Quebec. Additionally, Arnold offered
wages and provisions to those who would enlist.77 As a result, the expe-
dition gained over fifty new members, as well as their canoes for trans-
portation.78
The budding relationship between Arnold and the Quebecois inhab-
itants proved very useful for his military objectives. When Arnold ini-
tially arrived in Quebec he heard reports that the habitants in the parish
of Point-Levis had been ordered by Governor Guy Carleton to take up
arms against Arnold and his force. He also learned that the British had
destroyed or removed all the boats of the habitants in the area to prevent
him from crossing the St. Lawrence River into Quebec City.79 One
French inhabitant, Jacques Parent, went ahead of Arnold and read Gen-
eral Washington’s message to the Quebecois people, reaching as far as
the parish of Sainte-Marie-de-Beauce by November 2.80 Arnold and his
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Knowing that prejudice against French-
speakers and Catholics was common among
Americans, General George Washington is-
sued an order to Arnold to prevent his men
from insulting the habitants of Quebec. The
order was obeyed, and the habitants of
southern Quebec helped Arnold’s men re-
cover from their arduous trek through west-
ern Maine. From Henry E. Chambers, A
Higher History of the United States (New
York and New Orleans: University Publish-
ing Company, 1898), p. 211. 
men had certainly made a good impression on the Quebecois whom
they met, and word of their mission spread through the townsfolk in the
region. Upon entering a parish, John Pierce noted that “when it was Dis-
covered who we were the Bells in the mass house were Set to ringing
&.C.” in celebration.81
On November 3, the remaining bulk of Arnold’s force entered the
frontier villages of the French and Indians who had recently received
Arnold and his small provision-seeking force warmly. It was a turning
point in the expedition, as the entire force had finally completed the trek
through the Maine wilderness. The inhabitants immediately began feed-
ing those who were starving and administering aid to those who were
ill.82 Many of the soldiers noted that the French people had received the
expedition with kindness and hospitality. They supplied the men with
provisions and hired themselves out to ferry the men to the place where
they were to meet Arnold. Abner Stocking recalled that the French
“seemed moved with pity for us and to greatly admire our patriotism
and resolution, in encountering such hardships for the good of our
country.”83 The Natives also aided the expedition by not only providing
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Quebec City was one of the few cities in North America built within the protec-
tive confines of stone walls. The St. Louis Gate is pictured here in the nineteenth
century. On December 31, 1775, in the Battle of Quebec, American forces failed
to capture the walled upper part of the city. It was the first major defeat for the
Patriot forces in the Revolutionary War. From John Codman II, Arnold’s Expedi-
tion to Quebec (New York: MacMillan, 1902), opposite p. 294. 
food and transportation but also traveling into the wilderness to help
stragglers and those who were too famished to continue. The compas-
sion of the French Catholics became apparent to the Protestant Yankees
when they came upon a member of the expedition who had perished
before breaking free of the wilderness. They treated his body with 
the care and ritual, as though he were one of their own. “This real
Catholicism toward the remains of one we loved, made a deep and wide
breach upon” sixteen-year-old John Henry’s “early prejudices” against
Catholics.84
The hospitality given by these French Catholics was very surprising
to many of the men in the expedition. In the eighteenth century, most
Protestants condemned the Catholic “papists” as being controlled by Sa-
tan himself, through his Anti-Christ pawn, the Pope. Additionally, in the
eyes of the Patriots, the French colonists in Quebec were partial to both
the social and economic systems of feudal France, and had little use for
the representative government of the English.85 After crossing into Que-
bec, one soldier, seemingly in disbelief, noted that “the people are all
French and Indians, but they are exceedingly kind to us.”86 Many of
Arnold’s men had a similar reaction to the hospitality of the French
colonists and Wabanaki of Quebec, especially those who had also served
in the French and Indian War, which had ended just over a decade ear-
lier. In fact, it was possible that some of the French and Wabanaki men
in the villages in which Arnold’s men were so warmly received had
served in the prior conflict as well.87
One historian has claimed that “the need of succor for the exhausted
troops and so charitable the response of the peasant that the religious is-
sue was immediately and automatically voided.”88 Although the writings
of several of the expedition members prove this to be exaggerated, the
hospitable reception and tender care provided by the Quebecois cer-
tainly bridged the gap of cultural understanding. Indeed, the agonizing
expedition through the wilderness of Maine caused these soldiers to be
more tolerant of the French and Native religion and culture. The expedi-
tion’s provisions began to be restored as bread, milk, eggs, potatoes, and
turkeys were purchased from the inhabitants. They even purchased lux-
ury items such as sugar, rum, and brandy. The nourishment provided by
the French became a double-edged sword, however, for some in the ex-
pedition, after being so long without food. They gorged themselves on
potatoes, beef, bread, and vegetables. John Henry described one man as
attempting to “defy death for the mere enjoyment of present gratifica-
tion.” Unfortunately, this soldier “died two days later.”89
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As the expedition moved further into the Beauce territory toward
the parishes of Gilbert and Sainte Marie, and as the soldiers’ hunger sub-
sided, some began to question the good will of the Quebecois in provid-
ing provisions and transportation services. Henry Dearborn com-
mented that “the Inhabitants appear to be very kind, but ask a very Great
price for their Victuals.”90 Abner Stocking echoed these sentiments, stat-
ing that, because the French were “knowing [of] our need of their arti-
cles, some of them would extort from us an extravagant price.”91 Several
other soldiers made similar observations in their journals and historians
have often highlighted such comments in order to show that the habi-
tants took advantage of expedition members. In a well-known Canadian
history textbook, for example, the authors noted that if “American sol-
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As Arnold and his men invaded Quebec from the east, General Richard Mont-
gomery led another contingent of American soldiers into Canada from the west.
Montgomery and his men captured Montreal and later met Arnold’s force to lay
siege to Quebec City in December 1775. Montgomery was killed during the un-
successful attempt to take Quebec’s capital city. From John Codman II, Arnold’s
Expedition to Quebec (New York: MacMillan, 1902), opposite p. 180.
diers were willing to pay good prices for supplies, the habitants sympa-
thized with them.”92 Historian James Kirby Martin, in his biography of
Arnold, contended that “although the habitants enthusiastically wel-
come Les Bostonnais, as they called the soldiers, they also charged dearly
for whatever supplies the detachment needed.” However, “Arnold did
not complain; he was anxious to gain the habitant’s confidence and alle-
giance.”93
Although some of his men complained about the inflated prices
charged by the Quebecois, Arnold did not. He merely noted in his diary,
“we have been very kindly received by the inhabitants who appear very
friendly, and willing to supply us with provisions.”94 As a merchant who
often traded with people in Quebec, Arnold likely realized that the in-
habitants in the hinterland had very limited food stores and supplies of
provisions, which typically would have to last them until the following
year’s harvest. With winter approaching, the Quebecois would not have
had enough food in their stores to feed both their families and commu-
nities for the winter as well as Arnold’s starving force. They charged
heavily inflated rates because it would take a large, possibly community-
wide trip to an urban trading center to obtain the supplies they lost.
Supporting this argument, the soldiers in Arnold’s force had made simi-
lar complaints in their diaries about the peripheral settlers on the Upper
Kennebec.95 In other words, the Quebecois people were not attempting
to price gouge the expeditionary force because they were Anglo-Ameri-
cans, but instead were looking for a fair trade price for their goods con-
sidering the season, much like the American inhabitants of the Upper
Kennebec.
The accommodation between the Patriots and the French inhabi-
tants did not end at religion, trade, and transportation. The American
soldiers also interacted with the inhabitants on a social level as well.
Some men went out looking for a good time. On November 4, Dr. Isaac
Senter and another expedition member, for example, “visited an old
peasant’s house, where was a merry old woman at her loom, and two or
three fine young girls.”96 Upon learning that her guests were Americans,
the old woman “sung a French song to the tune of Yankee Doodle
Dandy. [We] laughed heartily” and “made ourselves very happy,” Senter’s
companion noted.97 Quebecois women also graced the pages of Moses
Kimball’s and Private Caleb Haskell’s diaries as well. On the following
evening, November 5, Kimball recorded that they “stop’d at a clever old
Frenchman’s house where they gave us rum & bread & butter, as much
as we wanted. There was two pretty girls at the same house. Stayed till
the next day.”98 Haskell wrote that he was “put up at a house where we
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were kindly received. Here we found a woman who could speak Eng-
lish.”99 None of the soldiers mentioned having a sexual encounter with a
Quebecois woman, but that does not mean that none occurred. Cer-
tainly the American men were interested and happy to have seen young
beautiful women after six weeks in the “howling wilderness” between
Fort Western and the Chaudière River Valley. This mixing of the sexes
between the Patriot soldiers and the female inhabitants served as a
means to shatter social and cultural barriers between the Anglo-Ameri-
cans and French habitants, which facilitated further accommodation
and acceptance between the two groups. 
As his force approached the fortifications of Quebec City, Arnold’s
French allies in Quebec helped him again, this time with reconnaissance
work. On November 8, Arnold wrote to General Richard Montgomery,
who had taken command of the western prong of the invasion of
Canada when General Schuyler became ill. In this letter, Arnold reported
that the French habitants had alerted him to the presence of “two
frigates and several small armed vessels lying before Quebec, and a large
ship or two lately arrived from Boston.”100 This clearly provided both
General Montgomery and Colonel Arnold with sensitive intelligence
about the fortifications at Quebec before their arrival. In addition to
military intelligence, Arnold was able to enlist several “Canadian me-
chanicks” in the “making of scaling ladders and lannuts, &C” as well as
shoes for those who had lost theirs on the trek through the wilder-
ness.101 These items were to be crucial in the siege of Quebec.
As Arnold and his men continued on toward Quebec City, several
men were left behind due to illness or injury. John Joseph Henry, for ex-
ample, came down with a high fever and was incredibly ill after eating
too much following his arduous journey through the woods. Arnold
gave him two silver dollars and called across the river to one of the
French inhabitants to come across with his canoe and pick up Henry.
The man carried Henry into his house, where Henry slept for two days.
Henry was unable to eat anything, as gorging was the cause of his symp-
toms. On the third day of his convalescence, Henry was able to rise out
of bed and his hostess, the peasant’s wife, set a place for him at the
breakfast table. Ready to set back out on the trail, Henry offered the
peasant man the two silver dollars that Arnold had given him. The man
refused with “disdain in his countenance, intimating to me that he had
merely obeyed the dictates of religion and humanity.” 
The man then insisted on transporting Henry forty-some miles to
aid him in catching up with the expedition. When offered the two dol-
lars again, the man refused, stating that Henry may need them for food,
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lodging, or supplies before he was able to meet with the rest of his de-
tachment.102 When Henry had first entered the villages of Quebec he
“expected there could be little other than barbarity.” Instead, he “found
civilized men, in a comfortable state, enjoying all the benefits arising
from the institutions of a civil society.”103 The generosity of this humble
Quebecois family to lodge, feed, and transport Henry without remit-
tance was illustrative of the relationship that had formed between
Arnold, his men, and the Quebecois people. 
Additionally, it was not assured that the men in Arnold’s expedition
would obey orders to be kind and respect the inhabitants of the Beauce
region. After the disastrous trek through the wilderness, the warm recep-
tion given to the Patriot force by people in the small French parishes
changed the Patriots’ feelings towards both the society and the culture of
the Quebecois and Wabanaki peoples. Historian Thomas Desjardin pro-
nounced that it “created a warm bond between the Americans and the
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Although Arnold’s expedition to capture Quebec City in 1775 ended in failure,
the rebelling American colonists ultimately defeated the British and gained in-
dependence. General George Washington accepted the final surrender of British
forces in Yorktown, Virginia, in October 1781. Maine Historical Society Collec-
tions.
French hosts.”104 The Patriots, Quebecois, and Indians decided to en-
gage in economic, social, and cultural accommodation.
Although Arnold and his men were able to conquer the Maine
wilderness and achieve a state of accommodation with the Quebecois
and Wabanakis of the Beauce region, the mission to capture Quebec was
a failure. Arnold had underestimated the fortifications of the city as well
as the willingness of its inhabitants to defend it. The merchants of Que-
bec, regardless of their ideological alliances, realized that a war between
colony and empire would destroy their trade business and thus their
lives.105 Clearly, the autonomous reaction of these residents of Quebec
was to protect their self interest while tucked safely behind the walls of
the city where they did not fear Arnold’s invading force and thus had no
use for accommodation.
After his defeat at Quebec, Arnold gained both fame and infamy
during the course of America’s war for independence. Eventually, Arnold
became a general in the Continental Army. His military exploits were
commended and his service to the American war effort was thought of
as invaluable, especially his leadership on the ground during the battle at
Saratoga, New York, in the fall of 1777.106 However, despite entering the
war effort in 1775 as one of the richest merchants in Connecticut,
Arnold described being in a state of poverty in 1779. Because the Conti-
nental Congress failed to accept Arnold’s expense reports due to shoddy
record keeping, he funded most of the invasion of Canada with his own
money.107 As a result of his economic situation and his poor political
standing, Arnold decided to betray his Patriot brethren and joined the
British for ten thousand dollars in gold and a commission as a brigadier
general in the British Army.108 Had Arnold not changed sides, it is likely
that he would have become one of the most celebrated war heroes and
leaders in American history. 
Viewing Arnold’s expedition into the wilderness of Maine through
the lenses of both environmental and borderlands history provides in-
sight into what has been previously characterized as merely a heroic and
impressive show of endurance and leadership. The wilds of Maine pro-
vided not only food, medicine, and supplies for the expedition, but also
visual aesthetics – the picturesque beauty of the environment and the
wonders of the natural world – which served as nourishment for both
the troops’ bodies and minds. Yet, despite being a great provider for the
expedition, the bountiful wilds of Maine could not provide enough sup-
port for the traditional European war machine to allow it to overcome
the obstacles rendered by this same wilderness. 
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The trials and tribulations experienced during the march endowed
Arnold with the respect and admiration of the Quebecois and Indian
peoples of the Beauce region. Had it not been for the unique properties
of this wilderness borderland it is unlikely that Arnold would have been
immediately received warmly by the local population. If the French and
Wabanakis had people decided to obey the issuance of martial law by
Governor Guy Carlton, and met Arnold and his men with force instead
of food, it is likely that “Arnold’s army could have been annihilated while
still scattered and starving” in the wilderness.109 The reaction to General
Washington’s written request for food and aid was not assured by any
means.
Borderlands historians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron have
contended that frontier regions like the Maine-Quebec borderlands in
the eighteenth century were often “the site of intense imperial rivalry
and of particularly fluid relations between indigenous peoples and Eu-
ropean interlopers – in other words, these were borderlands.”110 The Na-
tive peoples provided aid to the Americans, thus continuing their bor-
derland narrative of playing off one non-Native power against the other.
The Quebecois showed that they had no loyalty to their British colonial
masters but instead maintained their traditional position of neutrality,
Christian goodwill, and accommodation in the face of the struggle be-
tween the Patriots and the British. The reactions of the Natives from the
Wabanaki territory and the Frenchmen from southern Quebec showed
that this region truly was a borderland region. 
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